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WORKING THROUGH THE CONFRONTATION
CLAUSE AFTER DAVIS v. WASHINGTON
Andrew Dylan*
In Davis v. Washington, the U.S. Supreme Court clarified its newly
minted approach to the Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause, set out
just two years earlier in Crawford v. Washington. While Davis provides
some guidance to the lower courts in their attempts to separate
"testimonial" from "nontestimonial" statements-the hinge on which
confrontation jurisprudence now swings-it falls short of offering a bright-
line rule. In fact, Davis may be construed as endorsing not one but three
tests for determining whether a statement is testimonial, prompting
confusion and inconsistency in the lower courts. This Note attempts to sort
through the alternatives in an effort to effect a stable and uniform
confrontation jurisprudence.
INTRODUCTION
The Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause guarantees a criminal
defendant the right "to be confronted with the witnesses against him."' In
Crawford v. Washington,2 the U.S. Supreme Court radically revised its
understanding of the confrontation right, discarding a jurisprudential stance
that had, over the previous quarter-century, reduced the Confrontation
Clause to something approaching a duplicate of the hearsay rule.3 The
Court's prior approach, based on Ohio v. Roberts, conceived of the
Confrontation Clause simply as a guarantor of the substantive "reliability"
of criminal evidence.4 Crawford replaced this standard with a procedural
rule requiring that "testimonial" evidence from an out-of-court declarant be
subject to cross-examination if it is to be admissible at trial.5
Two years later, in Davis v. Washington, the Court clarified what it
meant in Crawford by "testimonial" evidence, holding that, for
confrontation purposes, a statement is testimonial when it describes past
events, and that a statement is nontestimonial when the declarant is
* J.D. Candidate, 2008, Fordham University School of Law. Thanks to Professor James
Kainen for his guidance, and to my wife Susan for her patience.
1. U.S. Const. amend. VI.
2. 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
3. See Richard D. Friedman, Confrontation: The Search for Basic Principles, 86 Geo.
L.J. 1011, 1015 (1998).
4. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980).
5. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68.
1905
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
describing events as they occur, particularly in the context of an "ongoing
emergency." 6 In the wake of Davis, both state and federal courts have
struggled to respond to confrontation challenges in a consistent way. The
lower courts' difficulties suggest that the Supreme Court's current
confrontation jurisprudence has failed to completely remedy the primary
defect of the old Roberts test, namely, its tendency to produce unpredictable
results under a readily manipulable standard.7
This Note suggests that, while the Supreme Court's recent reevaluation
of the Confrontation Clause may be doctrinally and historically sound, it
has yet to produce a coherent, workable, and predictable constitutional
standard in the lower courts. However, with proper refinement, the
Crawford/Davis standard may yet effect the stability and predictability that
the Court has long sought in this area of the law. This Note attempts to
expose the difficulties that Crawford and Davis posed for lower courts, and
to suggest solutions that comport with the Supreme Court's rationale and
policy concerns. Part I traces the modem history of the Confrontation
Clause, examining the rise and fall of the Roberts test and the ascendancy
of the Crawford standard. Part II examines the disparate approaches to
Confrontation Clause jurisprudence adopted by the lower courts in response
to Crawford and Davis. Finally, Part III proposes that the Crawford/Davis
standard remains workable, provided that the lower courts adhere to an
approach that hews closely to the historical purpose of the Confrontation
Clause as defined by the Supreme Court.
I. THE SUPREME COURT'S MODERN CONFRONTATION JURISPRUDENCE
Until the Supreme Court's 1965 decision in Pointer v. Texas, which
made the Confrontation Clause applicable to the states through the
Fourteenth Amendment, 8 the Court had little reason to develop a general
theory of confrontation rights, as the hearsay bar had effectively handled
most evidentiary challenges up until that time. 9  After Pointer, the
Confrontation Clause rendered a broad category of statements in state
prosecutions "inadmissible as a matter of federal constitutional law,"
which, in turn, required the Supreme Court to produce "a theory of the
Confrontation Clause" to be applied in the lower courts.10 In 1970, in two
separate concurrences, Justice John Harlan crafted two distinct theories of
the confrontation right, but his efforts twice failed to win a majority of the
Court." I In Ohio v. Roberts, decided ten years after Justice Harlan's initial
6. Davis v. Washington, 126 S. Ct. 2266, 2273-74 (2006).
7. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 66-68.
8. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 403 (1965).
9. See Friedman, supra note 3, at 1014.
10. Id.
11. See California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 174 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring) (arguing
that the test for defining confrontation rights should be based on the availability of the
declarant and that the prosecution should be required to produce any available witness);
Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 95-96 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring) (arguing that in some
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efforts, the Court finally subscribed to a working theory of the
confrontation right, standardizing what previously had been a undefined
area of constitutional law. 12
A. Ohio v. Roberts: The Reliability Test and Its Critics
In Ohio v. Roberts, the defendant Herschel Roberts was convicted for
forging checks and possessing stolen credit cards. 13  On appeal, the
defendant challenged the trial court's admission of a transcript from a
pretrial hearing. 14 At that hearing, the defendant called the daughter of the
couple whose checks and credit cards had been stolen and attempted to get
her to admit that she had given the defendant the checks and credit cards
with the tacit permission of her parents. 15  The witness denied this
assertion, but the defendant did not seek to declare the witness hostile or to
cross-examine her. 16 Shortly after the preliminary hearing, the witness left
Ohio, making her unavailable to testify at trial. 17
At trial, the defendant testified on his own behalf, claiming that the
absent witness had given him permission to use her parents' checks and
credit cards.' 8 Over the defendant's Confrontation Clause objection, the
court allowed the prosecution to rebut the defendant's version of the events
by introducing the transcript of the absent witness's statements at the
preliminary hearing. 19 The defendant was convicted, and the conviction
was reversed on appeal. 20
Intending to "respond[] to the need for certainty in the workaday world
of conducting criminal trials,"21 Justice Harry Blackmun's Roberts opinion
set out the Court's framework for analyzing confrontation challenges:
In sum, when a hearsay declarant is not present for cross-examination
at trial, the Confrontation Clause normally requires a showing that he is
unavailable. Even then, his statement is admissible only if it bears
adequate "indicia of reliability." Reliability can be inferred without more
cases there would be little value in requiring the prosecution to bring forward every available
defendant); see also Roger W. Kirst, Does Crawford Provide a Stable Foundation for
Confrontation Doctrine?, 71 Brook. L. Rev. 35, 41-44 (2005).
12. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 64-65 (1980) (noting that the Court had never
previously attempted to map out a complete theory of the Confrontation Clause, but that its
prior decisions on the matter made a general approach "discernible").
13. Id. at 58.
14. Id. at 59.
15. Id. at 58.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 59.
18. Id.
19. Id. Ohio law permitted the use of pretrial examination testimony when a witness
"cannot for any reason be produced at the trial." Id. (citation omitted).
20. Initially, an Ohio court of appeals reversed on the ground that the prosecution had
failed to establish that it had made a good faith effort to locate the unavailable witness. The
Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed the court of appeals' decision, but on the ground that the




in a case where the evidence falls within a firmly rooted hearsay
exception. In other cases, the evidence must be excluded, at least absent a
showing of particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.2 2
Effectively then, Roberts created a two-pronged test. To admit an out-of-
court statement over a Sixth Amendment challenge, it was necessary for a
court to find (1) that the declarant was unavailable to testify, and (2) that the
declarant's statement was "reliable" in terms of trustworthiness. In
devising this test, Justice Blackmun determined that the "underlying
purpose" of the Confrontation Clause was "to augment accuracy in the
factfinding process," and consequently the Clause should not be construed
as a bar to hearsay "marked with ... trustworthiness. '" 23
1. The Constitutionalization of the Hearsay Rule
Because the Confrontation Clause and the hearsay rule both serve to limit
the introduction of out-of-court statements in criminal trials, they are in
some sense overlapping doctrines. In tying the Confrontation Clause to a
reliability test, the same rationale underpinning many exceptions to the
hearsay rule, Roberts left little room for distinction between the criteria for
admissibility under these two separate doctrines. 24 Despite this overlap, the
Supreme Court subsequently noted that the Confrontation Clause and the
hearsay rule remained separate doctrines.25
Such assurances from the Court aside, Roberts and its progeny prompted
a chorus of complaint from scholars, who roundly criticized the Roberts
doctrine for its constitutionalization of the hearsay rule. 26  Under the
Roberts-era position that "a statement that qualifies for admission under a
'firmly rooted' hearsay exception is so trustworthy that adversarial testing
[under the mandate of the Confrontation Clause] can be expected to add
little to its reliability," 27 it should have come as no surprise that the Roberts
test (which admitted testimony based on its "reliability") and the hearsay
exceptions (also premised on "reliability") would so regularly yield
identical results.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 65.
24. Roberts noted that "hearsay rules and the Confrontation Clause are generally
designed to protect similar values." Id. at 66 (quoting California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 155
(1970)).
25. See White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 352 (1992) ("We have been careful 'not to
equate the Confrontation Clause's prohibitions with the general rule prohibiting the
admission of hearsay statements."' (quoting Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 814 (1990))).
26. See Friedman, supra note 3, at 1020 ("[W]e see the Confrontation Clause being
conformed to ordinary hearsay doctrine."); Jerome C. Latimer, Confrontation After
Crawford: The Decision's Impact on How Hearsay Is Analyzed Under the Confrontation
Clause, 36 Seton Hall L. Rev. 327, 334-35 (2006) ("Some argue that . . . the Court has
effectively constitutionalized the hearsay rules and most of the exceptions in spite of its
previous declaration to the contrary ... .
27. White, 502 U.S. at 357.
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This arrangement created a number of difficulties. As one commentator
explained,
First, the Court's [then-]current approach requires a constitutional
analysis of every out-of-court statement offered at a criminal trial, no
matter how tangential to the issues at hand. Such a zealously broad
approach could not have been intended by the framers. Second, the rigid
approach set forth by the Court could conceivably allow any out-of-court
statement into evidence which fortuitously fell into a firmly rooted
hearsay exception or which demonstrated indicia of reliability, even if
such statement took the form of an ex parte affidavit or similar device.
28
Thus, the Roberts test was too broad, in the sense that it created a
constitutional issue on the admissibility of virtually every out-of-court
statement offered at trial. At the same time, the Roberts test was too rigid,
depriving trial courts of the ability to police a defendant's confrontation
rights once an out-of-court statement met a well-rooted hearsay exception.
The Roberts-era Court also drew criticism for "infusing the
[Confrontation] Clause with a meaning that made the admissibility of
hearsay constitutionally suspect," and then "abdicat[ing] to the common
law its role in elaborating that meaning." 29  The problem with this
arrangement is that, unlike the Confrontation Clause, the common law
hearsay rule was not developed with the primary purpose of protecting the
rights of criminal defendants. 30 Although courts have always required a
high degree of trustworthiness where hearsay exceptions are concerned,
institutional considerations-such as the need to streamline dockets and
concern over excluding potentially probative evidence-may have pushed
courts over the centuries to "brook a greater degree of error" in the
development of the hearsay rule-and Roberts effectively imported this
common law tolerance for error into the Constitution.
3
'
2. Judicial Determinations of Reliability Confound
the Truth-Seeking Process
The Roberts analysis conceived of the Confrontation Clause as a device
designed to aid the truth-seeking process at trial. 32 However, the Roberts
test "puts the cart before the horse, essentially asking whether the assertion
made by the statement is true as a precondition to admissibility." 33 This
approach brought a "utilitarian perspective" to constitutional analysis,
eliminating the importance of "cross-examination for its own sake as a
libertarian or deontological imperative," placing the ends of the Clause, the
28. Latimer, supra note 26, at 336.
29. Samuel C. Kaplan, "Grab Bag of Principles" or Principled Grab Bag?: The
Constitutionalization of Common Law, 49 S.C. L. Rev. 463, 494 (1998).
30. See id.
31. Id. at 495.
32. See Friedman, supra note 3, at 1027.
33. Id. at 1027-28.
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reliability of evidence, before the means, the literal right to confrontation.34
Further, even if Roberts did correctly find that the purpose of the
Confrontation Clause was to guarantee the reliability of evidence, it
provided "very ineffectual safeguards to accomplish this objective."'35
Roberts left enormous discretion to the trial judge, which in turn led to the
likelihood of inconsistent results. 36 And, because the reliability test was so
fact specific, it was largely "immune to effective appellate monitoring. ' '37
3. The Lack of Historical Support for the Roberts Test
The marriage of the hearsay and confrontation doctrines led Justice
Clarence Thomas to complain in his White v. Illinois dissent,
There appears to be little if any indication in the historical record that
the exceptions to the hearsay rule were understood to be limited by the
simultaneously evolving common-law right of confrontation.... [I]t is
difficult to see how or why the Clause should apply to hearsay evidence
as a general proposition. 38
Justice Thomas's focus on the original purposes of the Confrontation
Clause would lay much of the groundwork for the eventual overthrow of
the reliability test in Crawford.
The Roberts test created further historical confusion by asking the lower
courts to determine which hearsay exceptions were "firmly rooted" for the
purpose of Confrontation Clause analysis. For instance, Roberts-era courts
found that the common law exceptions for present sense impressions and
statements against penal interest were admissible as firmly rooted hearsay
exceptions, even though neither exception was recognized by the common
law at the time the Sixth Amendment was ratified. 39 For years, these
inconsistencies cast a shadow over Roberts as it was applied in the lower
courts.
B. Crawford v. Washington: The Testimonial/Nontestimonial Distinction
In 2004, in Crawford v. Washington, the Supreme Court discarded the
Roberts test, replacing it with a new theory of confrontation that turns on
the testimonial quality of an out-of-court statement offered against a
criminal defendant. 40 In Crawford, a criminal defendant was convicted of
stabbing a man who had allegedly attempted to rape his wife.41 At trial, the
prosecution introduced a tape-recorded statement that the defendant's wife
34. Tom Lininger, Prosecuting Batterers After Crawford, 91 Va. L. Rev. 747, 759
(2005).
35. Id.
36. See id. at 760; Friedman, supra note 3, at 1031.
37. Friedman, supra note 3, at 1029.
38. White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 362-63 (1992) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
39. See Kaplan, supra note 29, at 486-88.
40. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
41. Id. at 38.
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had made to the police, which cast doubt on the defendant's claim of self-
defense. 42 Over the defendant's Confrontation Clause objections, the trial
court admitted the recordings, finding that they displayed "particularized
guarantees of trustworthiness" as required under the Roberts test.43
The Washington Court of Appeals reversed on confrontation grounds,
finding that the wife's statement lacked "particularized guarantees of
trustworthiness." 44 This decision was reversed again by the Washington
Supreme Court, which found that the wife's statement met the reliability
threshold of the constitutional confrontation standard.45 Reviewing the
back-and-forth determinations of the courts below, Justice Antonin Scalia,
writing for the Court, described this case as "a self-contained demonstration
of Roberts' unpredictable and inconsistent application. '46 Justice Scalia
explained that, were the Supreme Court simply to reverse the Washington
Supreme Court's decision based on its own reliability analysis, it would
"perpetuate, not avoid, what the Sixth Amendment condemns. '47 He
continued, "[The framers] knew that judges, like other government officers,
could not always be trusted to safeguard the rights of the people," and "[b]y
replacing categorical constitutional guarantees with open-ended balancing
tests," the Court had deviated from the core purpose of the Confrontation
Clause. 48 Accordingly, the Court discarded the "inherently, and therefore
permanently, unpredictable" Roberts test.4 9
To correct the Court's confrontation jurisprudence, Justice Scalia turned
to "[t]he founding generation's immediate source of the concept," the
English common law, with its tradition of live, in-court testimony, subject
to cross-examination. 50 This tradition of adversarial testing dates back to
Roman times, but its modern incarnation developed in reaction to Queen
Mary's introduction of the civil law practice of admitting the pretrial
examinations of absent witnesses into evidence at trial.51  It was this
practice that led to the infamous miscarriage of justice at the trial of Sir
Walter Raleigh. 52
Justice Scalia's examination of the history of the common law
confrontation right led him to conclude that "the principal evil at which the
Confrontation Clause was directed was the civil-law mode of criminal
procedure, and particularly its use of ex parte examinations as evidence
42. Id. at 38-40.
43. Id. at 40. The prosecution could not call the wife as a witness, because
Washington's marital privilege, which the defendant refused to waive, bars a spouse from
testifying against another spouse without consent. Id.
44. Id. at41.
45. Id. at 41-42.
46. Id. at 66.
47. Id. at 67.
48. Id. at 67-68.
49. Id. at 68 n. 10.
50. Id. at 43.
51. Id. at 43-44.
52. Id. at 44.
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against the accused. ' 53 Consequently, the Court rejected a view of the
Confrontation Clause dating back to Wigmore, which would allow the
accused to confront witnesses at trial, but not to confront out-of-court
declarants, whose hearsay testimony could still be admitted 54:
Where nontestimonial hearsay is at issue, it is wholly consistent with
the Framers' design to afford the States flexibility in their development of
hearsay law. .. as would an approach that exempted such statements from
Confrontation Clause scrutiny altogether. Where testimonial evidence is at
issue, however, the Sixth Amendment demands what the common law
required: unavailability and a prior opportunity for cross-examination.55
In reaching this conclusion, Justice Scalia implied that prior Supreme
Court confrontation decisions had mistakenly focused on the wrong element
of the Confrontation Clause-"confrontation"-when the word "witness"
was in fact the key element of the Confrontation Clause. 56 Justice Scalia's
exposition of the confrontation right hinged on his use of Webster's
Dictionary's 1828 definition of the word "witness"--one who "bear[s]
testimony"--with "testimony" defined as "[a] solemn declaration or
affirmation made for the purpose of establishing or proving some fact."'57
Applying these definitions to the Sixth Amendment, the Court indicated
that "[a]n accuser who makes a formal statement to government officers
bears testimony in a sense that a person who makes a casual remark to an
acquaintance does not," and it is the former category of statements with
which the Confrontation Clause is concerned. 58
The Court then proceeded to offer several other formulations describing
testimonial statements without adopting a decisive rule. Testimonial
statements could include "ex parte in-court testimony or its functional
equivalent," such as affidavits or custodial examinations, "that declarants
would reasonably expect to be used prosecutorially"; "extrajudicial
statements . . . contained in formalized testimonial materials"; and
"statements that were made under circumstances which would lead an
objective witness reasonably to believe that the statement would be
available for use at a later trial."'59
Having reformulated the core of the Confrontation Clause's protections,
the Court then set out to define its boundaries. Once again, Justice Scalia
looked to the state of the law at the time of ratification, finding that "the
Framers would not have allowed admission of testimonial statements of a
witness who did not appear at trial unless he was unavailable to testify, and
the defendant had had a prior opportunity for cross-examination." 60 The
53. Id. at 50.
54. Id. at 50-51.
55. Id. at 68.
56. See Kirst, supra note 11, at 86.
57. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 51-52 (citations omitted).
60. Id. at 53-54.
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Court then reviewed its own line of confrontation cases and concluded that
the results of its prior decisions hewed closely to its new, historically sound
standard, even if the rationales supporting those prior decisions did not.61
The Court then discarded the Roberts formula as a "manipulable" balancing
test that failed to "satisfy constitutional demands," 62 and announced its new
formulation of the confrontation right in unequivocal terms: "Where
testimonial evidence is at issue ... the Sixth Amendment demands what the
common law required: unavailability and a prior opportunity for cross-
examination." 63  Without satisfying those preconditions, the testimonial
statement of an absent declarant would be constitutionally barred.
Crawford thus revamped the landscape of the Confrontation Clause.
Turning the old reliability analysis on its head, Justice Scalia summed up,
"Where testimonial statements are at issue, the only indicium of reliability
sufficient to satisfy constitutional demands is the one the Constitution
actually prescribes: confrontation." 64  However, the Crawford Court
declined to offer a comprehensive explanation of the distinction between
testimonial and nontestimonial hearsay, offering only a general guideline:
"Whatever else the term [testimonial] covers, it applies at a minimum to
prior testimony at a preliminary hearing, before a grand jury, or at a former
trial; and to police interrogations. '65 In effect, Crawford's intense focus on
the history of the Confrontation Clause left modem courts with "no clear
principles for deciding whether a particular statement is testimonial or
nontestimonial. 66
Rightly predicting the "interim uncertainty" that would follow, 67
Crawford encouraged a surge of scholarly commentary intended to offer a
more complete definition of what the Court meant by "testimonial"
evidence. 68 Some went so far as to argue that Crawford simply exchanged
one balancing test for another, "with the balancing now being carried out in
61. Id. at 57-60. The one arguable exception to this trend was White v. Illinois, 502 U.S.
346 (1992), which allowed the admission of a child victim's spontaneous declarations to a
police officer. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 58 n.8. In dicta, the Court then cast doubt on the
viability of testimonial statements admitted as excited utterances, stating that, under the
common law of 1791, "to the extent the hearsay exception for spontaneous declarations
existed at all, it required that the statement be made 'immediat[ely] upon the hurt received,
and before [the declarant] had time to devise or contrive any thing for her own advantage."'
Id. (quoting Thompson v. Trevanion, (1693) 90 Eng. Rep. 179 (K.B.)).
62. Id. at 67-69. In his dissent, Chief Justice William Rehnquist indicated that
Crawford had overruled Roberts. Id. at 75 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). However, a Court
majority did not acknowledge Roberts's demise until Davis v. Washington, 126 S. Ct. 2266,
2275 n.4 (2006).
63. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68.
64. Id. at 68-69.
65. Id. at 68. Some commentators have assumed that the Court's imprecise definition of
"testimonial" was a result of a compromise necessary to secure a majority. See, e.g., Latimer,
supra note 26, at 358.
66. Kirst, supra note 11, at 88.
67. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68 n.10.
68. See, e.g., Kirst, supra note 11; Latimer, supra note 26; Lininger, supra note 34.
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deciding whether any statement should be labeled testimonial. 69
Understandably, the lower courts struggled to apply Crawford to difficult
fact patterns, such as statements made to police or 911 operators in response
to an emergency, which in turn led to varying and unpredictable results.70
Further, in response to Crawford's suggestion that formality may play a
role in determining whether a statement is testimonial, some law
enforcement agencies changed their techniques, hoping to elicit informal
statements that would skirt the boundaries of Crawford.71  As one
commentator summarized the problem, "The appeal of the testimonial
interpretation as a bright-line test rests on the assumptions that testimonial
and nontestimonial statements are so clearly different that they can be
readily distinguished,.. . [but] [t]he opinions of other courts have shown
that the distinctions are not easy to make." 72
C. Davis v. Washington: The Ongoing Emergency Test
Two years after Crawford, the Supreme Court revisited the Confrontation
Clause in Davis v. Washington and its companion case Hammon v. Indiana,
further delineating the distinction between testimonial and nontestimonial
statements. In Davis, the trial court admitted an audio tape of a domestic
violence victim's 911 call, finding it nontestimonial over the defendant's
Confrontation Clause objection.73 The Washington Court of Appeals and
Washington Supreme Court both affirmed the trial court's determination
that the evidence was admissible. 74 In Hammon, the trial court allowed a
police officer to testify to the contents of an affidavit filled out at the scene
of the crime by a domestic violence victim who refused to testify against
her attacker.75 The Indiana Court of Appeals and Indiana Supreme Court
both affirmed the trial court's determination that the victim's statements at
the scene were excited utterances that were nontestimonial under the
Confrontation Clause. 76
The Supreme Court affirmed Davis and reversed Hammon. In doing so,
it articulated a new standard for determining whether a statement is
testimonial or nontestimonial:
69. Kirst, supra note 11, at 70. Roger W. Kirst suggested that Crawford's focus on the
historical development of the confrontation right requires any such balancing test to be
controlled by history, rather than "present-day factors." Id. Kirst argued further that Justice
Antonin Scalia's reliance on antifederalist documents to set the parameters of the
Confrontation Clause may have "warp[ed] the ratification history," as the antifederalists
cited by Scalia were making broad political arguments, not debating the intricacies of
English common law. Id. at 81-83.
70. The two cases that the Supreme Court reviewed in Davis both involved statements
offered to authorities during domestic violence incidents. See infra Part I. C.
71. See Kirst, supra note 11, at 88-89.
72. Id. at 90.
73. Davis, 126 S. Ct. at 2271.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 2272.
76. Id. at 2273.
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Statements are nontestimonial when made in the course of police
interrogation under circumstances objectively indicating that the primary
purpose of the interrogation is to enable police assistance to meet an
ongoing emergency. They are testimonial when the circumstances
objectively indicate that there is no such ongoing emergency, and that the
primary purpose of the interrogation is to establish or prove past events
potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution. 77
Applying this rule to the cases before it, the Court found that the primary
purpose of the 911 call in Davis was to seek police assistance to resolve an
ongoing emergency, but that in Hammon, the declarant's statements to the
police were made in a formalized manner, after the emergency had ended,
and that, consequently, those statements could not be admitted at trial
without allowing the defendant to cross-examine the declarant. 78
The Court reached its decision by once again considering the historical
meaning of the terms "witness" and "testimonial," just as it had done in
Crawford.79 The Court concluded that, in order for a statement to be
testimonial, it must seek to establish or prove some past event. 80 By
contrast, when a speaker narrates events as they are happening, the
statement will not be considered testimonial. 81 The Court fleshed out this
distinction by contrasting the facts of Davis with the facts of Crawford,
focusing on the fact that "any reasonable listener" would recognize that the
911 call in Davis was made in the face of "an ongoing emergency," and that
the nontestimonial statements made by the caller "were necessary to be able
to resolve the present emergency," rather than to restate past events. 82
Additionally, the Court found that "the difference in the level of formality
between the two interviews [was] striking. '83
The interview in Hammon, on the other hand, consisted of inadmissible
testimonial hearsay, because the circumstances of the interview indicated
that the emergency had passed by the time the declarant had offered her
statements, and, "[o]bjectively viewed, the primary . . . purpose of the
interrogation was to investigate a possible crime .. ."84 The Court also
noted that the interview in Hammon was "formal enough" to produce
testimonial statements, even though the statements were elicited at the
crime scene while the declarant's husband forcibly attempted to interrupt
77. Id. at 2273-74.
78. Id. at 2276-79.
79. Id. at 2274; see also supra note 57 and accompanying text. Curiously, Davis did not
insist on framing the Confrontation Clause completely within the common law of 1791. In a
footnote discussing the relatively relaxed levels of formality necessary to create testimonial
statements, Justice Scalia noted that "[r]estricting the Confrontation Clause to the precise
forms against which it was originally directed is a recipe for its extinction." Davis, 126 S. Ct.
at 2278 n.5.
80. See Davis, 126 S. Ct. at 2276.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 2276-77.
84. Id. at 2278.
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the police interview. 85 Because the statements narrated past events, after
the emergency had ended, the statements were testimonial. 86
The Court was careful to indicate that its holding did not categorically
mark as testimonial all responses to the "initial inquiries" of police at a
crime scene.87  Further, it cautioned police and prosecutors against
manipulating the way in which evidence is gathered: "While [they] may
hope that inculpatory 'nontestimonial' evidence is gathered, this is
essentially beyond police control. Their saying that an emergency exists
cannot make it be so." 88
While the Court's holding seemed to offer something approaching a
bright-line rule, several qualifications tended to blur the edges of the
decision. For instance, the Court noted that it did not wish to imply "that
statements made in the absence of any interrogation are necessarily
nontestimonial" and that "in the final analysis [it is] the declarant's
statements, not the interrogator's questions, that the Confrontation Clause
requires us to evaluate." 89 The Court also added that "our holding today
makes it unnecessary to consider whether and when statements made to
someone other than law enforcement personnel are 'testimonial.' 90
Further complicating the Court's opinion was its acknowledgment that
certain statements, though initially nontestimonial, may "evolve into
testimonial statements" over the course of the interrogation, such as when
an excited 911 caller calms down over the course of the call and begins
offering statements that go beyond that which is necessary to meet the
exigency of the moment, as was the case in Davis.91 Additionally, the
Court expressed its confidence that "trial courts will recognize the point at
which, for Sixth Amendment purposes, statements in response to
interrogations become testimonial. '92  Finally, the Court reaffirmed a
position it originally had taken in Crawford, supporting the application of
the rule of forfeiture by wrongdoing to extinguish a defendant's
confrontation rights when the defendant procured the unavailability of a
witness set to testify against him.93
Justice Thomas, the lone dissenter in Davis, accused the Court, just two
years after its abandonment of Roberts, of issuing "an equally unpredictable
test, under which district courts are charged with divining the 'primary
purpose' of police interrogations." 94 The trouble with the Court's new
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 2279.
88. Id. at 2279 n.6. The Court then cryptically summarized its position on government
manipulation of statements taken at crime scenes by noting that "testimonial statements are
what they are." Id.
89. Id. at 2274 n.1.
90. Id. at 2274 n.2.
91. Id. at 2277 (citation omitted).
92. Id.
93. Id. at 2280.
94. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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approach, Thomas argued, is that "the purposes of an interrogation, viewed
from the perspective of the police, are both to respond to the emergency
situation and to gather evidence" and that discerning which of these
purposes has primacy amounts to "an exercise in fiction." 95  Although
ostensibly "objective," the Court's holding "would shift the ability to
control whether a violation occurred from the police and prosecutor to the
judge, whose determination as to the 'primary purpose' of a[n] ...
interrogation would be unpredictable and not necessarily tethered to the
actual purpose" of the police interrogation. 96 Instead, Justice Thomas
proposed a test that would consider only "formal" statements to police to be
testimonial, as the evidentiary use of such formal statements (including
affidavits, depositions, prior testimony, and confessions) were the very
prosecutorial abuses that the Confrontation Clause sought to check.
97
II. THE LOWER COURTS' EFFORTS TO APPLY DAVIS
Since Davis was handed down, the lower courts have struggled to apply
its rule in a consistent manner. The source of this difficulty lies in the
complexity at the core of the Davis holding. In one figurative breath, Davis
directed the lower courts to consider (1) the circumstances surrounding the
making of the out-of-court statement, (2) the primary purpose of the police
in taking the statement, (3) whether or not an objective observer could
determine that the statement was made in the course of an ongoing
emergency, and (4) the intent of the declarant in making the statement. 98
Most lower courts consider all of these factors, to varying degrees, in
determining whether an out-of-court statement is testimonial. As matters
stand though, Davis has essentially provided the lower courts with three
viable approaches to determining whether or not a statement is testimonial
for confrontation purposes. As Part II.A describes, trial courts may focus
on the intent of the declarant, focus on the intent of the listener, or focus on
the circumstances in which the statement was made. In practice, most
courts applying Davis will simply select one of these approaches over the
others in order to settle evidentiary challenges as they arise.
Making matters still more complicated for the lower courts, Davis fails to
articulate precisely what the Supreme Court meant by the term on which its
new confrontation analysis hinges-the "ongoing emergency."
99
95. Id. at 2283.
96. Id. at 2284.
97. Id. at 2282.
98. See supra Part I.C.
99. See Tom Lininger, Davis and Hammon: A Step Forward or a Step Back?, 105
Mich. L. Rev. First Impressions 28, 28 (2006),
http://www.michiganlawreview.org/firstimpressions/vol I 05/lininger.pdf ("[O]ne might
argue that the line of cases extending from Ohio v. Roberts to Crawford to Davis has not
reduced ambiguity, but has only relocated the ambiguity from the term 'reliable' (in




Consequently, as Part II.B discusses, the lower courts have split on whether
to apply a narrow or broad approach to this new doctrine. Making matters
still murkier, Davis also revives old questions concerning the place of the
excited utterance exception to the hearsay bar in relation to the
Confrontation Clause. Part II.C examines the following tension: Davis's
ongoing emergency test may suggest that excited utterances must be
considered per se admissible under the Confrontation Clause, but at the
same time Davis's strong reaffirmation of the confrontation right suggests
that such an approach would be unwarranted.
A. Whose Intent Controls?: Three Approaches to Determining Whether a
Statement Is Testimonial
1. Focus on the Intent of the Declarant
Even before the Supreme Court revised its confrontation jurisprudence in
Crawford, commentators had long argued for a confrontation right that
would be triggered by the subjective testimonial intent of the out-of-court
declarant. 100 While this approach may have enjoyed a short ascendancy in
the period immediately following Crawford,1° 1 the Court's ruling in Davis
casts some doubt on the continuing viability of such views.
Instead, Davis prompts the lower courts to determine whether a statement
is testimonial by focusing primarily on the circumstances in which the out-
of-court statement was made. 10 2 If the circumstances indicate that the
government's primary purpose in taking the statement was to investigate a
past criminal event, the statement will be considered testimonial and
therefore inadmissible under the Confrontation Clause. 10 3  If the
circumstances indicate that the government's primary purpose in taking the
statement was to use it to resolve an ongoing emergency, the statement will
be considered nontestimonial and therefore admissible. 0 4 The core of the
Court's holding then seems to preclude the lower courts from considering
the subjective intent of the declarant in determining whether or not a
statement is testimonial.
Focusing on the circumstances in which the statement was made
produces practical advantages. As an initial matter, it provides trial judges
with a stable, objective framework that relieves them of the messy
guesswork inherent in making evidentiary determinations that turn on the
100. See, e.g., Friedman, supra note 3, at 1029.
101. See, e.g., United States v. Saget, 377 F.3d 223, 228 (2d Cir. 2004) ("Crawford at
least suggests that the determinative factor in determining whether a declarant bears
testimony is the declarant's awareness or expectation that his or her statements may later be
used at a trial."); see also Latimer, supra note 26, at 409-10 (arguing in favor of "focus[ing]
on the intent of the declarant determined by evaluating the surrounding circumstances"
(citing Commonwealth v. Gonsalves, 833 N.E.2d 549, 558 (Mass. 2005))).
102. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
103. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
104. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
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subjective intent of witnesses who are absent from the proceedings. 10 5
Additionally, focusing on police motives might reduce the likelihood of
investigative police interrogation of declarants "at a time when declarants
are so distraught that they are not contemplating prosecutorial use of their
statements." 
106
At the same time though, the Court's move away from an approach that
focuses on the declarant's intent raises certain problems. As an initial
matter, Justice Scalia's Davis opinion relies on the same 1828 Webster's
Dictionary definitions of the key Confrontation Clause terms, "witness" and
"testimony," which had supported his opinion in Crawford.'0 7 Webster's
definition of "testimony" implied a volitional element on the part of the
speaker: "a solemn declaration or affirmation made for the purpose of
establishing or proving some fact."'108 However, Justice Scalia's opinion
shifts the emphasis away from the speaker's "purpose," focusing instead on
the purposes of the government in taking the speaker's statement.10 9 This
move could yield troubling results-allowing, for instance, the statements
of "malicious accusers" to be offered against a criminal defendant without
affording him the opportunity to cross-examine the slanderer. " 0
In addition to these analytical problems, the language of Davis itself
suggests the continued viability of the subjective declarant approach. In an
effort to forestall the possibility of prosecutors and police from
manufacturing "emergencies" in order to admit testimonial hearsay, the
Court made it clear that it is "in the final analysis the declarant's statements,
105. Cf Latimer, supra note 26, at 399 (describing post-Crawford courts' tendency to
"apply[] Crawford's testimonial approach to suspend logic, to selectively emphasize
Crawford criteria that support admission and ignore others, or to undermine the underlying
need and importance of confrontation in these situations"). But see Lisa K. Griffin, Circling
Around the Confrontation Clause: Redefined Reach but Not a Robust Right, 105 Mich. L.
Rev. First Impressions 16, 18 (2006),
http://www.michiganlawreview.org/firstimpressions/voll05/griffin.pdf (arguing that Davis
offers only a totality of the circumstances test and that "[sitating seven times in the opinion
that it is an 'objective' test does not make it so").
106. Lininger, supra note 99, at 30.
107. Davis v. Washington, 126 S. Ct. 2266, 2274 (2006) (citing Crawford v. Washington,
541 U.S. 36, 51 (2004)).
108. Id.
109. See Robert P. Mosteller, Davis v. Washington and Hammon v. Indiana: Beating
Expectations, 105 Mich. L. Rev. First Impressions 6, 9 (2006),
http://www.michiganlawreview.org/firstimpressions/voll05/mosteller.pdf; see also Andrew
C. Fine, Refining Crawford: The Confrontation Clause After Davis v. Washington and
Hammon v. Indiana, 105 Mich. L. Rev. First Impressions 11, 12 (2006),
http://www.michiganlawreview.org/firstimpressions/voll05/fine.pdf ("This standard is
analytically problematic: though the purpose of the Crawford inquiry is to determine
whether the declarant should be treated as a 'witness' under the Confrontation Clause, the
Court nevertheless ostensibly requires lower courts to resolve that decisive question from a
perspective that renders the declarant's motive or reasonable expectation irrelevant.").
110. See Mosteller, supra note 109, at 9 ("[D]efendants are harmed just as much by
malicious accusers acting on their own as they are by government manipulation of those




not the interrogator's questions, that the Confrontation Clause requires us to
evaluate."'1 However, it is worth noting that Justice Scalia's language
requires the lower courts to evaluate the declarant's statements, not the
declarant's intentions. 12
Since Davis, most lower courts have moved away from an approach
based purely on the intent of the declarant. If the declarant's intent is to be
considered at all, it will fall within some form of a multifaceted approach to
confrontation questions. For example, in State v. Mechling, the Supreme
Court of Appeals of West Virginia found that Crawford and Davis require
"a court assessing whether a witness's out-of-court statement is
'testimonial' [to] focus more upon the witness's statement, and less upon
any interrogator's questions." 113  At the same time, Mechling also
considered whether an objective witness would recognize that the
declarant's statements would be available for use at trial, and whether the
statements were made in the course of an ongoing emergency." 14
Ultimately, the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reversed and
remanded the conviction in Mechling, focusing primarily on the
circumstances in which the challenged, out-of-court statements were made,
rather than on the statements themselves, or on the intent of the
declarant."15
As Mechling indicates, Davis has pushed the lower courts toward more
multifaceted approaches in determining whether a statement is testimonial,
but it has not generated a consensus on the lingering viability of the
subjective declarant approach. For instance, the Washington Court of
Appeals recently found that, under Davis, "the critical question ... is
whether the circumstances objectively indicate the declarant's purpose."" 16
The court then found that statements made by a declarant to medical
111. Davis, 126 S. Ct. at 2274 n.1; see also Michael H. Graham, The Davis Narrowing of
Crawford: Is the Primary Purpose Test of Davis Jurisprudentially Sound, "Workable, "" and
"Predictable?, " 42 Crim. L. Bull. 604, 611 (2006) (arguing that, under Davis, courts will
"continue to espouse the view that a reasonable belief or expectation ... of the declarant that
the statement would be used 'against' the accused . . . makes the statement . . .
'testimonial').
112. Perhaps Justice Scalia's tautology, "testimonial statements are what they are," Davis,
126 S. Ct. at 2279 n.6, suggests that testimonial statements are testimonial by their very
nature, and no amount of intent on the part of the declarant, or lack thereof, can make it
otherwise, diminishing the importance of the declarant's subjective intent, and elevating the
importance of the language contained in such statements in its own right. Of course, such an
interpretation runs afoul of the definition of "testimony" cited by the Court. See supra note
108 and accompanying text.
113. State v. Mechling, 633 S.E.2d 311, 321-22 (W. Va. 2006).
114. Id.
115. Specifically, the court found that statements given to police by a domestic violence
victim were made after the emergency had passed, and that the record did not sufficiently
reveal "the circumstances surrounding" another witness's intervention in the dispute. Id. at
323-24.
116. State v. Annyas, No. 55512-0-I, 2006 WL 2724070, at *4 (Wash. Ct. App. Sept. 25,
2006). In doing so, the court rejected an argument that would focus on the expectations of
the witness, rather than the declarant.
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personnel after "she decided to report the crime" were testimonial, based on
the volitional element in the declarant's speech.1 17 On the other hand, the
Minnesota Court of Appeals has stated that Davis "emphasized that the
expectations of the declarant are not determinative," as such an approach
would not provide adequate protection against government manipulation of
Sixth Amendment standards. 18 Given such wildly different interpretations
of Davis, it can only be said that the viability of an approach focusing
primarily on the intent of the declarant remains unsettled.
2. Focus on the Circumstances in Which the Statement Was Made
The core holding of Davis lays out a relatively bright-line rule that a
statement made to government officials in the course of an ongoing
emergency will be considered nontestimonial, while a statement narrating
past events, after an emergency has passed, will be considered
testimonial. 19 Consequently, the lower courts have widely understood
Davis as a mandate to examine the circumstances surrounding the making
of an out-of-court statement to determine if it is admissible under the Sixth
Amendment. In practice, however, this approach has led to curious results
that tend to conflict with the central concerns of Crawford and Davis.
On its surface, Davis asks lower courts to focus on the circumstances
surrounding the making of an out-of-court statement in order to determine
the intention of the government officials who took that statement.1 20 The
advantage of this approach rests in the clarity that it brings to the
confrontation analysis. Under Davis, the difference between testimonial
and nontestimonial hearsay hinges on a "distinction between past and
ongoing crimes-a distinction that is doctrinally straightforward, if perhaps
somewhat difficult to apply in particular cases." 121 Effectively, then, by
offering an empirical test that focused objectively on the circumstances
surrounding the making of a statement, rather than the subjective intentions
of the declarant, Davis could potentially infuse the Confrontation Clause
with a new measure of fairness and stability.
However, the shortcomings of hanging confrontation analysis on the
circumstances surrounding a statement tend to undermine Davis's wider
policy goals. As an initial matter, Davis failed to articulate a clear
definition of the "ongoing emergency" test used to determine whether a
statement is testimonial or nontestimonial.1 22 The failure to rein in this
concept may leave lower courts with "the flexibility to reach varying
117. Id. at *6.
118. State v. Krasky, 721 N.W.2d 916, 923 (Minn. Ct. App. 2006).
119. Davis v. Washington, 126 S. Ct. 2266, 2273-74 (2006).
120. Id.
121. Lininger, supra note 99, at 30.
122. See infra Part II.B.
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outcomes based on notions of expediency rather than doctrinal
consistency."1 23
Furthermore, Davis raises certain practical difficulties that tend to
weaken the confrontation right. For instance, Davis requires courts to
evaluate the circumstances surrounding the making of a challenged
statement "objectively."' 124 In an effort to curtail prosecutorial misconduct,
the Supreme Court further insisted that police "saying that an emergency
exists cannot make it be so."' 125 However, courts will find it extremely
difficult to discount an officer's claim that he believed an emergency to be
ongoing at the time he questioned the declarant. 126 Depending on the
availability of evidence to the contrary, an officer's subjective claim that he
believed an emergency to be ongoing may then stand as the only grounds
necessary for a court to deny a confrontation challenge, despite the
confrontation right's origins as a protection against prosecutorial abuse. 127
A Texas court of appeals' decision in Vinson v. State demonstrates many
of the shortcomings of an approach that focuses on the circumstances in
which the statement is made.' 28 In Vinson, the court heard the defendant's
appeal from a domestic assault conviction, in which the defendant argued
that the trial court erred when it allowed a deputy sheriff to relate
incriminating statements made by the victim when the deputy arrived at the
scene. 1
29
The fact pattern in this case had much in common with facts of
Hammon. 130 In Vinson, when the deputy arrived, he asked the victim a
series of preliminary questions intended to ascertain if the domestic
emergency was still ongoing, as permitted by Davis.131 The deputy then
continued with "subsequent questioning" (the extent and formality of which
is not revealed) of the victim as the defendant entered the room. 132 The
defendant then began "implicitly" ordering the victim to answer the
deputy's questions in a way that would prevent the defendant's arrest. 133
123. Lininger, supra note 99, at 28; see also Joan S. Meier, Davis/Hammon, Domestic
Violence, and the Supreme Court: The Case for Cautious Optimism, 105 Mich. L. Rev. First
Impressions 22, 26 (2006)
http://www.michiganlawreview.org/firstimpressions/voll 05/meier.pdf ("What is an
'emergency' and when it begins and ends likely will provide litigants with fodder for years
to come.").
124. Davis, 126 S. Ct. at 2273-74.
125. Id. at 2279 n.6.
126. See Fine, supra note 109, at 12.
127. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 50 (2004).
128. See Vinson v. State, 221 S.W.3d 256 (Tex. App. 2006).
129. Id. at 264-67.
130. See Davis v. Washington, 126 S. Ct. at 2272-73 (describing the facts of Hammon:
police arrived at a domestic violence scene, which was littered with broken glass from a
recent argument, and the suspected abuser repeatedly attempted to interfere with police
questioning of the declarant-victim).
131. Vinson, 221 S.W.3d at 264-65 (citing Davis, 126 S. Ct. at 2276).
132. Id. at 265.
133. Id. at 266.
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The victim gave the defendant's name and explained the circumstances
leading up to the altercation.134
Because the defendant remained present and was "very excited" during
the interview, the court determined that the circumstances "objectively
indicated an ongoing and dangerous situation ... very different from that in
[Hammon], in which the assailant was not present during the interview, and,
clearly, no emergency existed any longer."'135 The court accordingly found
that the emotionally shaken declarant's statements were nontestimonial.136
While the Texas court of appeals discerned a clear difference between the
facts of Vinson and the facts of Hammon, on close inspection, this finding
seems at the very least debatable. 137 As set out in the court's opinion, the
facts of Vinson seem nearly identical to those of Hammon: a domestic
violence victim offers statements to an investigating officer after she has
been separated from her attacker, while the attacker attempts to intervene in
the police interrogation. It is therefore difficult to determine why, based on
an objective view of the circumstances surrounding the making of the
statement, the Vinson court determined that the out-of-court statements
were made in the course of an ongoing emergency, when the Hammon
portion of the Davis opinion reached the opposite conclusion.138
More troubling though, is the court's reliance on the deputy's own
subjective account of the circumstances in reaching the conclusion that the
incriminating statements were made in the course of an ongoing
emergency. 139 The court accepted the deputy's claim that he never "felt
safe" until after the arrival of his partner-despite the fact that the
defendant had already been restrained in the deputy's patrol car at the time
that the deputy called for backup. 140 In relying so heavily on the officer's
perception of the circumstances surrounding the making of the statements,
the court showed little concern for both Crawford's and Davis's
apprehensions of prosecutorial abuse. Davis specified that the rule it
announced was not intended to be open to prosecutorial manipulation:
134. Id.
135. Id. at 266-67.
136. Id.
137. Compare id., with Davis v. Washington, 126 S. Ct. 2266, 2272-73 (2006). One
notable difference between Vinson and Hammon, never mentioned by the court, is the
difference in level of the formality of the statements offered by the victims in each case.
While in Vinson the declarant merely answered the officer's questions orally, in Hammon the
declarant wrote out a formal affidavit.
138. The court further acknowledged that the declarant's statements "concerned past
events," Vinson, 221 S.W.3d at 267, a trait that Davis identified as a hallmark of testimonial
statements, Davis, 126 S. Ct. at 2274. The Texas court nonetheless found such statements
admissible, based on the deputy's description of the circumstances in which they were made.
Vinson, 221 S.W.3d at 267.
139. See Vinson, 221 S.W.3d at 266; see also Fine, supra note 109, at 12 (predicting that,
"[w]hen determining the 'primary purpose' of questioning, it will be difficult for courts to
ignore an officer's claim that he believed the emergency to be ongoing when he questioned
the declarant").
140. Vinson, 221 S.W.3d at 266
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"saying that an emergency exists cannot make it be So. ' 1141 The Vinson
court failed to consider that caveat, basing its objective determinations
almost entirely on a police officer's subjective assessment of a domestic
dispute that had ended upon his arrival, despite the Supreme Court's
warning in Davis.
Decisions such as Vinson do not indicate the failure of a confrontation
jurisprudence that focuses on the circumstances surrounding the making of
the challenged statement. However, Vinson does suggest that, in its current
form, such an approach may be too open-ended, allowing judges to make
constitutional determinations based on expediency rather than doctrinal
consistency. 142
3. Focus on the Intent of the Interviewer
Davis instructs the lower courts to make their Confrontation Clause
determinations based on an examination of the circumstances in which an
out-of-court statement is made. The purpose of this test is to provide the
courts with an objective means of ascertaining "the primary purpose of the
interrogation" that gave rise to that statement. 43 But because Davis's
ultimate concern rests with the motivations of the government officials who
procure statements from witnesses, Davis opens the possibility of lower
courts focusing directly on police intent, without necessarily considering
the circumstances in which the statement was made. 144
This approach draws some support from Davis and Crawford's position
that the historical purpose of the Confrontation Clause was to prevent
"flagrant inquisitorial practices" by government agents. 145  Given the
confusion surrounding the Court's newly minted "ongoing emergency"
test, 146 a direct consideration of police intent might in some cases prove an
effective method of determining whether a statement was procured for
prosecutorial purposes.
On the other hand, critics of this type of test, beginning with Justice
Thomas, have noted that determining the "primary purpose" of an
investigating police officer will often prove to be nothing better than an
exercise in "divin[ation]." 147 Justice Thomas points out that police officers
responding to an emergency generally will be led by the dual purposes of
resolving the emergency and collecting evidence for use in future
141. Davis, 126 S. Ct. at 2279 n.6.
142. See supra note 123 and accompanying text.
143. Davis, 126 S. Ct. at 2273.
144. In practice, many courts determine the primary purpose of investigating officers'
questioning by examining the circumstances in which the statement was made, as instructed
by Davis. This section considers those rare instances when courts seek to determine police
intent without relying on the ongoing emergency test.
145. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51 (2004).
146. See infra Part II.B.
147. See Davis, 126 S. Ct. at 2280 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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prosecution. 148 Trial judges faced with the task of determining which of
these police purposes was "primary" will, Justice Thomas argues, yield
inconsistent results "not necessarily tethered to the actual purpose of the
police interrogation."' 149 Furthermore, any test turning on the question of
police intent runs the risk of encouraging police manipulation,, 50 and any
test that does not consider the intent of the declarant potentially runs afoul
of the doctrinal justifications underlying Crawford.151
Despite this criticism, an approach focusing primarily on the intent of the
listener seems entirely valid under Davis. One extreme example of this
approach occurred in State v. Krasky, where the Minnesota Court of
Appeals read Davis as endorsing "a new approach that focuses on an
uncomplicated study of the purpose of an interviewer who takes a statement
that is later introduced at trial."' 152
The question in Krasky involved the admissibility of a videotaped
interview of a six-year-old child-abuse victim. 153 In finding the child's
statements to be testimonial, the court placed primary emphasis on the
intent of the interviewer, focusing primarily on the fact that the videotaped
interview of the child was conducted by a nurse practitioner who was
cooperating with the police. 154 Since the videotaped statement was made at
the behest of the police, and it described acts of abuse that had occurred
years earlier, the court found that the tape was prepared with prosecutorial
intent and was therefore testimonial. 155
Krasky is unusual in that it focuses so heavily on the motivations of the
police, without much discussion of whether or not the statements were
made in the course of an ongoing emergency. 156 It suggests that, where the
actions of police investigators indicate a clear intent to gather evidence for a
148. Id. at 2284-85.
149. Id.; see also Lininger, supra note 99, at 29 (noting the difficulty in determining the
"primary motive" of a questioning police officer); Meier, supra note 123, at 25 (criticizing
the "legal fiction" of the primary purpose test).
150. See Fine, supra note 109, at 12-13. But see Lininger, supra note 99, at 29 (arguing
that concerns of police manipulation may be "overblown").
151. See supra Part H.A.1.
152. State v. Krasky, 721 N.W.2d 916, 924 (Minn. Ct. App. 2006). This decision was
reversed by a divided Minnesota Supreme Court shortly before the publication of this Note.
See State v. Krasky, 736 N.W.2d 636, 643 (Minn. 2007) (holding that the primary purpose of
the investigation in this case was to protect the welfare of the child, not to obtain testimony,
and that Davis's ongoing emergency test did not apply in this context). The dissent
supported the appellate court's focus on the intent of the police, arguing that under Davis,
statements are testimonial when they are taken down to be used as evidence. Id. at 647-48
(Page, J., dissenting). While an approach that focuses on the intent of the declarant may no
longer be viable in Minnesota, this Note's examination of the appellate court decision may
still provide some insight into the workings of this approach, which remains available in
other jurisdictions.
153. Krasky, 721 N.W.2d at 917-18.
154. Id. at 919-20.
155. Id. at 920-24.
156. Since the victim was not living with her parents at the time of the interview, there
was no issue as to whether her statements described a pattern of abuse that was still
"ongoing." Id. at 922.
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future prosecution, a court need not rely solely on an examination of the
circumstances surrounding the making of the statement, but may base its
confrontation analysis on a direct consideration of police intent. 157
B. The Ongoing Emergency Test
Davis instructed courts to admit an unavailable declarant's out-of-court
statement only when the circumstances indicate that the statement was
made in the course of an ongoing emergency.158 Although the lower courts
must make this determination objectively, 59 the contours of this doctrine
remain unclear and, therefore, malleable.
One commentator has argued for an aggressive expansion of the
emergency concept: "Davis can easily be interpreted to make every single
surrounding circumstance, known or unknown, possibly associated with the
statement itself relevant in deciding emergency versus prosecutorial."' 160
No court has explicitly announced its support for such an expansive view of
the ongoing emergency concept, but under the open-ended language of
Davis, the trial courts seem to have wide leeway in determining the scope
of the ongoing emergency test.
Rather than taking a clear theoretical stand, most courts applying the
ongoing emergency test simply delve directly into some form of fact-
intensive inquiry and then announce their results. Often, despite Davis's
admonition that the existence of the ongoing emergency must be
determined objectively, the lower courts will base their determinations on
the subjective perceptions of either the declarant or the interviewer who was
at the scene. The lower courts' general reluctance to take a clear doctrinal
stance on this issue leaves several questions unanswered. First, and most
importantly, what are the physical and temporal end points of an ongoing
emergency? Second, does Davis mark statements made during all
emergencies as nontestimonial, or will only certain types of emergencies,
such as assault-based crimes, give rise to nontestimonial statements? For
instance, would a purely medical emergency also give rise to
nontestimonial statements?
In this state of uncertainty, the courts have adopted two general
approaches to the ongoing emergency concept: a "narrow" approach,
which limits the ongoing emergency concept to roughly the period of time
157. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit formulated an interesting
exception to this approach when it found that lab reports of toxicology tests constituted
nontestimonial business records, even when the lab technician creating the reports knew that
the reports were being prepared at the police's request for use in a future prosecution. United
States v. Ellis, 460 F.3d 920 (7th Cir. 2006).
158. Davis v. Washington, 126 S. Ct. 2266, 2273-74 (2006).
159. This element of Davis has raised skeptical eyebrows. See Griffin, supra note 105, at
18 ("Stating seven times in the opinion that it is an 'objective' test does not make it so.").
160. Graham, supra note 111, at 623. Michael H. Graham further claims that the concept
of an ongoing emergency "logically extends to circumstances requiring assistance from
medical personnel, firefighters, or other government services such as those dealing with
hazardous materials." Id. at 609.
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in which the declarant is exposed to danger, and a "broad" approach, which
tends to view ongoing emergencies expansively, extending the time frame
of the emergency beyond the point when the declarant's exposure to danger
has passed.
1. The Narrow Approach to the Ongoing Emergency Doctrine
Instead of providing a rigid rule, Davis leaves the application of the
ongoing emergency doctrine to the discretion of the trial judges, allowing
them to base their decisions on the facts in front of them.16 1 However, the
Court's analysis did note that once an officer has obtained information
necessary "to address the exigency of the moment," further statements by
the declarant should be considered testimonial. 162 The Court also found
that the domestic emergency in Davis had ended at the point when "[the
defendant] drove away from the premises."' 163 Davis also indicated that for
confrontation purposes, statements that relate "what happened" may be
marked as testimonial, in contrast to statements that describe "what is
happening."'164 The Court offered no further guidance for determining the
scope of an ongoing emergency for Confrontation Clause purposes, but its
findings suggest that a "narrow" approach to the ongoing emergency
doctrine would be appropriate, limiting the scope of the emergency to the
time frame in which the declarant was subject to actual risk of harm from
the source of danger.165
As a matter of doctrinal consistency, the narrow approach, implicit in
Davis, tends to fall in line with the Court's general reaffirmation of the
confrontation right, which began with Crawford. Insofar as Davis functions
as a clarification of the work that the Court began in Crawford,166 the
narrow approach prevents the ongoing emergency test from potentially
swallowing the Confrontation Clause whole. 167 Furthermore, as a practical
matter, the narrow approach provides a reasonably clear end point to the
161. Davis, 126 S. Ct. at 2277.
162. Id.
163. Id.; see also State v. Mechling, 633 S.E.2d 311, 321 (W. Va. 2006) ("[T]he phrase
'ongoing emergency' means just that.").
164. Davis, 126 S. Ct. at 2278. But see Griffin, supra note 105, at 17-18 ("[I]t is too
facile to suggest a clear distinction between statements about what 'is happening' and what
'has happened,' when the latter is almost always necessary to explain the former.").
165. See, e.g., Lininger, supra note 99, at 29 (arguing that an emergency should be
deemed to have ended once the assailant has left the scene). But see Griffin, supra note 105,
at 17 (indicating that Davis permits "[a]n unspecified amount of aftermath questioning [to]
escape the testimonial label").
166. See generally Richard D. Friedman, "We Really (for the Most Part) Mean It!, " 105
Mich. L. Rev. First Impressions 1 (2006),
http://www.michiganlawreview.org/firstimpressions/vol 105/friedman.pdf (describing
Davis's role in clarifying the ambiguities left in the wake of Crawford).
167. See infra Part II.B.2.
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ongoing emergency question, which in turn increases the likelihood of a
more consistent application of the rule.' 68
But by no means does the narrow approach offer a perfect solution. In its
strictest form it would provide the lower courts with a means of setting
clear end points, after which time an emergency would be deemed to have
passed. However, true rigidity may prove untenable, as the factual
variations of each individual case tend to require varying degrees of
flexibility in the rule. 169  In Davis itself, despite the Court's implicit
acceptance of the narrow approach, it admitted statements to a 911 operator
made even after Davis was in retreat, suggesting that an "unspecified
amount of aftermath questioning" might be considered nontestimonial.17
0
Furthermore, the narrow approach seems incapable of functioning
successfully in certain areas of criminal conduct. For instance, in the
domestic violence context, a court can rather easily determine the end point
of a violent "incident," but even when that incident has passed, the victim
will continue to be exposed to the latent danger inherent in any pattern of
domestic abuse. 171
2. Broad Approaches to the Ongoing Emergency Doctrine
Several courts have applied the ongoing emergency test in a broad
manner. Such courts tend to view the scope of the emergency in an
expansive fashion, allowing accusatory statements into evidence even
where the declarant was no longer in danger of further harm at the time the
statement is made.
Given the absence of a firm definition of the ongoing emergency concept
in Davis, the lower courts have found themselves facing relatively few
constraints when interpreting the rule. Lower courts adopting a broad
approach have tended to understand the ongoing emergency concept as
encompassing both danger to the public and danger to the declarant.
Therefore, whenever public safety is at risk, a court taking a broad view
would likely recognize the existence of an ongoing emergency and would
admit an out-of-court statement over a Confrontation Clause objection,
even if the declarant herself was not in immediate danger at the time of the
statement. Unlike the narrow approach, which sets definite end points to
the ongoing emergency concept based on the end of the declarant's personal
exposure to danger, the broad approach tends to expand the range of
accusatory statements admissible at trial, in direct correlation to the court's
determinations of the spatial and chronological bounds of the public risk.
168. But see Griffin, supra note 105, at 18 (arguing that Davis presents the lower courts
with what is effectively a "totality of the circumstances test in many ways more similar to
the Roberts reliability inquiry than the bright lines of Crawford').
169. See Lininger, supra note 99, at 28 (noting the flexibility of the ongoing emergency
test and expressing concern over the risk of inconsistency in its application).
170. Griffin, supra note 105, at 17.
171. Meier, supra note 123, at 26.
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While a broad view of the ongoing emergency test may be necessary to
preserve certain types of nontestimonial statements for use at trial, it tends
to place a great deal of discretion in the hands of the court, which may lead
to unexpected and inconsistent application of the principles handed down in
Crawford and Davis. For instance, in State v. Reardon, an Ohio court of
appeals considered an appeal from a home invasion robbery conviction,
based on an alleged violation of the Confrontation Clause. 172 Responding
to the victim's 911 call, police disrupted the crime. 173 As one officer
entered the home of the victims to gather information, his partner pursued
the robbers back to their own home on the same street. 174 Back at the
victims' home, one of the victims, in a hysterical state, blurted out the
names of the robbers and identified one of them by his lazy eye. 175 Based
on this description, the robbers were arrested, but the declarant was
unavailable to testify against them at trial.' 76  The court nonetheless
admitted the statement as an excited utterance, based on the emotional state
of the declarant at the time it was made.177
Following the defendant's Sixth Amendment challenge, the court of
appeals determined that the statement was nontestimonial under Davis, as it
was made to enable police to "meet an ongoing emergency."' 178 Even
though the victims' home was secure at the time the statement was made,
the court determined that the emergency was still ongoing, as the robbers
had not yet been detained, the police were as yet unsure how many suspects
were involved in the crime, and "[t]he officers needed to ensure their own
safety and the safety of the rest of the neighborhood by eliciting
information from the victims. '179
This decision raises difficult questions, in part because it relies so heavily
on the emotional state of the declarants as a measuring stick for determining
the scope of the emergency. 180 At the time the statements were made, the
declarants were in no immediate danger, as the suspects had already
retreated to hide in an accomplice's house. 18' Effectively, the court's
decision expanded the scope of the ongoing emergency to include the entire
neighborhood where the crime had taken place. While the risk to public
safety may have still seemed grave at the time the declarant offered her
statements, the court's decision offers no hint as to the point at which that
172. State v. Reardon, 860 N.E.2d 141 (Ohio Ct. App. 2006).
173. Id. at 142.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 142-43.
176. Id. at 143.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 144. The court also determined that, because the officer on the scene relayed
the declarant's statements over the police radio as the declarants answered his questions, and
because this questioning was done in an informal manner, the statements were designed to
assist the police in the resolution of an ongoing emergency. Id. at 144-45.
180. Under Davis, the lower courts are to determine the existence of an ongoing
emergency objectively. See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
181. Reardon, 860 N.E.2d at 143.
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danger would be deemed to have passed. Under this standard, it is difficult
to know how far from the source of danger the declarant may be while still
offering up nontestimonial statements. Taken to extremes, this approach
threatens to swallow the Confrontation Clause whole, as it provides courts
with the option of citing any danger, no matter how remote, circumventing
the defendant's right to cross-examine his accusers.
While Reardon supports the use of a broad "zone of danger" test,
extending the ongoing emergency concept to cover a wide geographic area
over a lengthy period of time, other courts have adopted a causation-based
approach to the doctrine. In State v. Alvarez, an Arizona court of appeals
considered a confrontation challenge to a first-degree murder conviction.18 2
While on a routine patrol, a sheriff's deputy came upon the victim-declarant
staggering down a deserted road.183 When the deputy approached the
victim, he saw that the victim's face was covered in blood.184 The victim
then collapsed, falling in and out of consciousness while the deputy
questioned him. 185 At trial, the deputy testified that he asked the victim his
name and what had happened to him.186 The victim responded that three
men had jumped him and taken his 1995 Suzuki. 187 The victim then fell
unconscious again and, two days later, he died.188
The defendant's appeal focused on the portion of the deputy's testimony
that recounted the statements of the victim.1 89 Specifically, the defendant
argued that the victim's statements were testimonial under Davis.190 The
court first considered the intent of both the victim and the deputy and
determined that the primary purpose of both parties was to secure the
victim's safety, not to produce information that could be used at a later
criminal proceeding.' 91
The court then considered whether the statements were made in the
course of an ongoing emergency. Focusing on the severity of the victim's
injuries and the fact that he died within 48 hours of making his statements,
the court found that the officer's questions were designed to resolve an
182. State v. Alvarez, 143 P.3d 668 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2006).




187. Id. In fact, the victim had been driving a Chevrolet rental vehicle on the day of the
attack, and the defendant was later caught in that vehicle. Id. at 669 n.2. The victim's Suzuki
had been reported stolen one month earlier in a presumably unrelated incident. Id.
188. Id. at 669.
189. Id. at 670. Originally, the defendant had merely objected to the deputy's testimony
on hearsay grounds (failing to preserve a confrontation objection), but the court of appeals
reviewed the defendant's confrontation claim to determine if a "fundamental error" had
occurred at the trial level. Id.
190. Id. at 670-71.
191. Id. at 673; see also Griffin, supra note 105, at 18 (arguing that under Davis
statements made for the purpose of obtaining medical attention should be considered
nontestimonial).
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ongoing emergency. 192 The defendant argued that the deputy's questions to
the victim as to "what happened" and the victim's subsequent incriminating
responses actually had little to do with resolving the medical emergency at
hand. 193 The court dismissed these arguments by noting that, "[a]lthough
the criminal activity that resulted in [the victim's] injuries and the ensuing
charges against [the defendant] had ended, the emergency that those events
set in motion was very much ongoing."' 94
Alvarez's expansive view of the ongoing emergency doctrine tends to
complicate Confrontation Clause jurisprudence, as it offers no clear point at
which an ongoing emergency is determined to have ended. Unlike
Reardon, which created problems concerning the end point of an
emergency, 195 Alvarez does not rely on a theory that would identify an
ongoing emergency by physically expanding the zone of danger. 196
Instead, Alvarez adopts a relatively open-ended causation-based approach
that, if pushed to its limits, might admit any statement as nontestimonial, so
long as the declarant continued to suffer the ill effects of the defendant's
deeds at the time the statement was made. 197
This version of the broad approach seems once again to run contrary to
the Supreme Court's views in Crawford and Davis. Although Davis fails to
provide a precise definition of the ongoing emergency concept, the
distinction it presents between statements that describe "what happened"
and "what is happening" provides some guidance as to the nature of the
concept.' 98  The Arizona court of appeals' decision to carve out an
exception to that precept tends to attenuate the rule laid out in Davis. For
instance, had the declarant-victim in Alvarez offered statements against his
attackers two days later, while lying in the hospital, would those statements
still be considered as falling within the emergency that the defendant had
"set in motion?"' 99 By failing to explain how far this exception would
extend, and to what types of emergencies it would apply to, the Arizona
court of appeals' approach invites inconsistency and confusion, which in
turn threatens to undermine the continued vigor of the confrontation right.
C. The Excited Utterance Hearsay Exception Under Davis
Prior to Crawford, the Supreme Court's confrontation jurisprudence was
commonly criticized for effectively having constitutionalized the hearsay
192. Alvarez, 143 P.3d at 674.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. See supra notes 172-81 and accompanying text.
196. The Alvarez opinion might have followed the same track as Reardon by, for
instance, finding that the officer was eliciting "what happened" statements from the victim in
an effort to help track down the perpetrators, who were likely still on the loose and a threat
to public safety at the time the statements were made.
197. This approach bears similarity to the doctrine of forfeiture by wrongdoing, which
received the approval of the Davis Court. See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
198. Davis v. Washington, 126 S. Ct. 2266, 2278 (2006).
199. See supra note 194 and accompanying text.
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rule.200 Since, under Roberts, any out-of-court statement that was admitted
under a "firmly rooted hearsay exception" would also be admissible under
the Sixth Amendment, Roberts essentially eliminated any distinction
between the rules of evidence and the Confrontation Clause. 201  By
adopting the testimonial approach in Crawford, the Court effectively
imposed a separate and distinct analytical step for the consideration of
confrontation challenges. Davis reemphasizes the separation between
confrontation and hearsay analysis, as it specifically barred, on
confrontation grounds, a set of statements that were admitted at trial under
the excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule.202
At the same time though, Davis's ongoing emergency test tends to flatten
the distinction between confrontation analysis and hearsay analysis under
the excited utterance exception. Lower courts commonly look to the same
sets of facts to determine both whether a statement was made during the
course of an ongoing emergency (the constitutional analysis) and whether
that same emergency "excited" the declarant at the time he spoke (the
hearsay analysis). This tendency has led one commentator to declare that
"Davis in fact made all statements properly considered excited utterances
admissible" on confrontation grounds, as "the government's 'primary
purpose' upon receipt of such statements is to respond to the emergency
presented and not to employ the statements received in a subsequent
criminal prosecution. '203 While this position may offer some appeal to law
enforcement, it tends to narrow the confrontation right and to subvert many
of the underlying concerns of Crawford and Davis by once again tying a
constitutional standard to a component of the hearsay rule.
In the interim between Crawford and Davis, the lower courts developed
three different tests for determining the admissibility of excited utterances
under the Confrontation Clause: (1) focusing on "whether the declarant
should have foreseen the use of the statement in a criminal prosecution," (2)
focusing on the level of formality of police interrogation, and (3) finding
that excited utterances are nontestimonial per se, as the declarant
necessarily lacks the clarity of mind to "contemplate future use of her
statement in a criminal prosecution. '204 Davis seems to supplant the first
two approaches, replacing them with the ongoing emergency test.205 Davis
then leaves the lower courts with two possible choices: (1) categorically
200. See supra Part I.A. 1.
201. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
202. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
203. Graham, supra note 11, at 605. Of course, Davis itself suppressed, on
confrontation grounds, the excited utterances in evidence in the Hammon portion of the
opinion, but Graham argues that the Indiana courts erred in allowing these statements as
excited utterances in the first place. Id. at 620.
204. See Lininger, supra note 34, at 778. Additionally, some courts considered the
motives of either the declarant or the police in the challenged conversation, and others
applied a "reasonable person" test to determine whether an objective speaker would have
expected that his statements would be available for use at trial. Id. at 780-81.
205. See supra Part II.A. 1-3.
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admit all excited utterances as nontestimonial statements, or (2) adopt a
fact-intensive, case-by-case approach.
1. The Categorical Approach
Before Hammon reached the Supreme Court, the Indiana Court of
Appeals determined that the excited utterances offered into evidence at the
defendant's trial did not violate the Confrontation Clause. The court based
this result on its finding that the very nature of the excited utterance
exception precluded the excited declarant from making testimonial
statements: "An unrehearsed statement made without time for reflection or
deliberation, as required to be an 'excited utterance,' is not 'testimonial' in
that such a statement, by definition, has not been made in contemplation of
its use in a future trial."'206 The basis for the categorical admissibility of
excited utterances on confrontation grounds rests then on a theory that
focuses on the intent of the declarant. 207 Under this approach, testimonial
statements necessarily include a volitional element on the part of the
declarant. It follows then, that if a declarant offers a truly spontaneous
statement, without time for reflection, the statement will necessarily be
nontestimonial.
However, most pre-Davis courts applying the Crawford test rejected the
categorical approach. In Florida, for example, a district court of appeals
reasoned that
a startled person who identifies a suspect in a statement made to a police
officer at the scene of a crime surely knows that the statement is a form of
accusation that will be used against the suspect. In this situation, the
statement does not lose its character as a testimonial statement merely
because the declarant was excited at the time it was made.208
The court therefore adopted a knowledge-based theory that sets aside the
lack-of-volition argument that underpins the categorical approach suggested
by the appeals court in Hammon. Under this view, even if a truly excited
declarant is caught in circumstances producing an immediate reaction that
renders him unable to frame his statements with an intent to incriminate, his
spontaneous outburst of speech would not preclude the possibility that he is
aware of the potential that his statements could be used at a later trial, and
such awareness may itself render the declarant's statements testimonial.
Davis, however, de-emphasizes the significance of the mental state of the
declarant, and raises, to a point of prominence, the trial court's inquiry into
the circumstances surrounding the making of the statement and the
206. Hammon v. State, 809 N.E.2d 945, 953 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004). On appeal, the Indiana
Supreme Court declined to adopt the categorical approach of the court of appeals, as it failed
to account for the motivation of government officers in eliciting statements from an excited
declarant. See Latimer, supra note 26, at 394 (citing Hammon v. State, 829 N.E.2d 444, 453
(Ind. 2005)).
207. Cf supra Part II.A.I.
208. Lopez v. State, 888 So. 2d 693, 699-700 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004).
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intentions of the police officer who recorded it.209 Consequently, the Davis
standard for determining whether a statement is testimonial brushes closely
against the Supreme Court's own prior formulation of the excited utterance
exception:
The basis for the "excited utterance" exception ... is that such statements
are given under circumstances that eliminate the possibility of fabrication,
coaching, or confabulation, and that therefore the circumstances
surrounding the making of the statement provide sufficient assurance that
the statement is trustworthy and that cross-examination would be
superfluous. 210
Potentially then, Davis validates the categorical approach to excited
utterance admissibility by reducing confrontation analysis and excited
utterance analysis to a single inquiry: what were the circumstances in
which the out-of-court statements were made?
There are, however, compelling reasons for resisting such a facile
conclusion. For instance, in Crawford, the Supreme Court signaled that
White v. Illinois, which admitted excited utterances as a "firmly rooted"
hearsay exception under the Roberts test, may have been wrongly
decided. 211 Crawford also indicated that excited utterances may not have
been admissible as testimonial hearsay in 1791,212 "the baseline year from
which the Court now derived its confrontation analysis. '213 Furthermore,
Justice Scalia's opinion indicated that, to be admissible under the
evidentiary standards of 1791, an excited utterance must be made within
close temporal proximity of the startling event. 214 In light of this stance, as
well as the Court's reversal of Hammon, the Supreme Court has made it
clear that it does not intend for the Confrontation Clause simply to fold
before the excited utterance exception.2 15
Beyond Justice Scalia's historical concerns, the excited utterance
exception raises special problems in its own right. Perhaps most troubling
is the excited utterance's susceptibility to bootstrapping. The excited
utterance exception is predicated upon the occurrence of some startling
event, which dominates the senses of the declarant, producing an automatic
response that precludes the declarant from engaging in the type of studied
self-reflection that may lead to fabrication.216 However, the party offering
the excited utterance into evidence need not corroborate the event that
209. See supra Part II.A.1-3.
210. Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 820 (1990).
211. See supra note 61.
212. See supra note 61.
213. Lininger, supra note 34, at 777.
214. Id. Crawford also indicated the Court's reluctance to admit excited utterances under
the Confrontation Clause where the testifying witness was not "present for the startling event
to observe the context of the statement." Kirst, supra note 11, at 101.
215. See Lininger, supra note 99, at 30 (noting that, had Davis admitted excited
utterances as nontestimonial per se, it would have "gutted" the Confrontation Clause).
216. See Fed. R. Evid. 803(2) advisory committee's note.
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triggers the exception with outside evidence. 217 Thus, in circular fashion,
an excited utterance may become admissible "simply because the
complainant said it," without further corroboration. 218  Consequently,
without a firm Confrontation Clause standing behind the relatively porous
excited utterance exception, a prosecutor could submit statements made by
an out-of-court declarant with relative ease, depriving the defendant of an
opportunity to cross-examine the source of those incriminating
statements219-exactly the type of prosecutorial abuse that Crawford
intended to prevent.
2. The Two-Tiered Approach
Since Davis, the categorical approach has fallen into general disfavor.
Rather than combining hearsay and confrontation analysis into a single test,
most courts carry out their hearsay and confrontation analyses separately,
on a case-by-case basis.
In State v. Rodriguez, a good example of this approach, the Wisconsin
Court of Appeals considered the appeal of a convicted batterer, who alleged
that his Sixth Amendment rights were violated by the admission of his
victims' excited utterances at trial, when the victims themselves did not
testify.220
The court employed a two-tiered approach to consider the admissibility
of the victims' statements. The court began by noting that there was
nothing to indicate that the victims' statements failed to qualify as excited
utterances, as their statements to the police were "[not] motivated by
anything other than their desire to get help and secure safety. '22 1
Having settled the hearsay issue, the court then considered the
defendant's confrontation argument. In doing so, the court considered the
intent of both the victims and the responding officers in finding that the
victims' statements were nontestimonial. Concerning the victims, the court
found that "given their contemporaneously endured trauma it cannot be said
217. See Brooks Holland, Using Excited Utterances to Prosecute Domestic Violence in
New York: The Door Opens Wide, or Just a Crack?, 8 Cardozo Women's L.J. 171, 182
(2002) (discussing the excited utterance rule in New York).
218. Id. However, the Supreme Court has found that allowing an excited utterance to be
supported by corroborating evidence might allow for the admission of unreliable statements
by "bootstrapping on the trustworthiness of other evidence at trial." Idaho v. Wright, 497
U.S. 805, 823 (1990). Furthermore, "confrontation of an excited declarant may be more
important than confrontation of a dispassionate declarant because the former is more likely
to fabricate or exaggerate details out of spite toward the assailant." Tom Lininger, Yes,
Virginia, There Is a Confrontation Clause, 71 Brook. L. Rev. 401, 404 (2005).
219. Holland, supra note 217, at 182.
220. State v. Rodriguez, 722 N.W.2d 136 (Wis. Ct. App. 2006). The statements of the
victims, a mother and daughter, were offered through the testimony of police officers who
had responded to a neighbor's telephone call reporting the beating. Additionally, one of the
officers testified as to statements made by the declarant on a follow-up visit the next day,
which uncovered another incident of abuse. Id. at 140-41.
221. Id. at 148.
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that objectively they said what they said to the officers with a conscious
expectation that their words would somehow have the potential for use in
court. ' 2 2 2 The court then considered the motivations of the officers at the
scene of the crime, determining that their primary motivation was not to
gather evidence of past activities for use in a future prosecution. 223 Instead,
the court determined that the officers' primary purpose was to assist in the
resolution of an ongoing emergency, making the victims' statements
nontestimonial under Davis.224
In focusing on the expectations of the declarant, the court adopted a
version of the same method applied in the Lopez case2 25: focusing on the
expectations, or knowledge, of the declarant at the time the statements were
made. The court's consideration of the primary purpose of the police at the
scene provided an additional layer of inquiry, serving as a bulwark to its
fully functioning, independent, confrontation analysis. Although in this
case the court ultimately determined that the same event that triggered the
declarants' excited utterances also produced the ongoing emergency, the
adoption of a two-tiered test helps ensure that the confrontation right and
the excited utterance exception remain separate doctrines under the law.
III. PROPOSALS FOR A MORE STABLE CONFRONTATION DOCTRINE
The now-defunct Roberts test drew criticism largely for its
unpredictability and its susceptibility to judicial manipulation.226  If
Crawford and Davis are to cure the Supreme Court's confrontation
jurisprudence of these defects, these cases must provide the lower courts
with stable means for determining the testimonial or nontestimonial nature
of out-of-court statements. This part suggests that greater uniformity under
the Confrontation Clause may be achieved by including a consideration of
the intent of the declarant in confrontation analysis, by adopting a narrow
approach to the ongoing emergency test, and by adopting a two-step review
of excited utterances offered against a defendant.
A. Restoring the Role of the Declarant's Intent
in Confrontation Jurisprudence
As matters now stand, the lower courts have three viable methods for
reviewing confrontation challenges: focusing on the intent of the declarant,
focusing on the circumstances in which the statement was made, and
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. Id. The lone dissenter in Rodriguez argued that the majority had failed to adhere to
Davis, as the victims' initial statements were made to police after the emergency had ended.
In the initial incident, the defendant had already left the scene by the time the police arrived
to take the victims' statements, and in the second incident the victims' statements to police
were made outside her home, under the protection of police, while the defendant hid inside.
Id. at 154 (Curley, J., dissenting).
225. See supra note 208 and accompanying text.
226. See supra notes 48-49 and accompanying text.
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focusing on the intent of the police conducting the interview. 22 7 While an
approach focusing on the intent of the declarant remains technically open
under Davis,228 the opinion suggests that the Court would prefer an
approach that concerns itself largely with the primary purpose of the
investigating officers responding to an emergency. 229 Lower courts may
attempt to make this determination based on a direct inquiry into police
motives, or indirectly by inferring the primary purpose of the police based
on an objective examination of the circumstances surrounding the making
of the statement.230
However, the Court's move away from an approach focusing on the
intent of the declarant does not forbid its use as a supplement to the
approaches that Davis more overtly sanctions. 231 Consequently, the lower
courts should feel free to supplement their determinations of police intent
with a second layer of inquiry that would focus on the intent of the
declarant. As Justice Thomas and others have indicated, one of the great
weaknesses of Davis is its failure to account for the fact that responding
police officers are typically motivated by multiple purposes, including both
the need to restore order and the need to collect evidence. 232 Determining
which of these purposes is "primary" leaves a great deal of discretion to the
judges, which may, in turn, result in the development of an inconsistent and
manipulable constitutional standard. 233 The Court's attempt to head off this
tendency through an approach that focuses on the circumstances
surrounding the making of the statement goes some way in providing
stability through an objective test, 234 but as the confusion surrounding the
nature of the term "ongoing emergency" demonstrates, such an approach,
on its own, fails to inject the Confrontation Clause with long sought-after
reliability.235 Supplementing the lower court's confrontation inquiry with a
third alternative would provide a fallback approach, capable of settling
difficult confrontation problems where the intent of the police is not
completely transparent, but the intent of the declarant is.
Retaining an approach that focuses on the intent of the declarant serves a
further purpose in adding to the doctrinal consistency of the Supreme
Court's recent confrontation jurisprudence. The 1828 dictionary that
Justice Scalia relied on in both Crawford and Davis defined "testimonial"
as "[a] solemn declaration or affirmation made for the purpose of
establishing or proving some fact. ''236 If indeed testimonial statements
must be "made for [a] purpose," then it is clear that in order for a statement
227. See supra Part II.A. 1-3.
228. See supra Part II.A. 1.
229. See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
230. See supra Part II.A.2-3.
231. See supra Part I.C and accompanying text.
232. See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
233. See, e.g., Fine, supra note 109, at 12-13.
234. See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
235. See supra Part II.B. 1-2.
236. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
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to be considered "testimonial" under this standard, the declarant must
intend for the statement to be used in a proceeding against the accused. 237
By shifting the question of intent almost entirely onto the police, the core
Davis holding threatens to unmoor the Confrontation Clause from its
historical foundations. 238 Retaining an approach that focuses on the intent
of the declarant, even if only as a supplement, restores a sense of doctrinal
consistency to the Confrontation Clause that might otherwise be lost.
B. Promoting Stability Through a Narrow Approach to
the Ongoing Emergency Test
Even if the lower courts begin supplementing their confrontation
jurisprudence by considering the intent of the declarant in difficult cases,
stability and consistency will not be achieved without additionally
establishing a clear and coherent approach to the ongoing emergency
concept.239 Under the current nebulous state of the test, the lower courts
have demonstrated a troubling tendency to interpret the ongoing emergency
concept as extending outward in both space and time, without
boundaries. 240 This open-ended approach threatens to once again reduce
the Confrontation Clause to the status of an evidentiary afterthought,
despite the Supreme Court's vigorous reaffirmation of the confrontation
right in both Crawford and Davis.24 1 Furthermore, the broad approaches to
the ongoing emergency test tend to subvert the goal of creating a stable,
coherent approach to the Confrontation Clause. 242
While the narrow approach to the ongoing emergency test does not, in
itself, inject automatic predictability into confrontation jurisprudence, it
goes a long a way toward resolving the problems that the broad approach
raises. 243 The great advantage of the narrow approach is its provision for a
clear end point, after which an emergency is no longer "ongoing." Once the
threat of harm to the declarant has passed, so has the emergency.244 Any
statements against the accused made after that point, relating to past events,
should be excluded by the Confrontation Clause. 245 Imposing such a severe
cutoff on the admissibility of out-of-court statements might initially seem
too protective of defendants, especially in domestic violence cases, where
237. The general examples of testimonial statements offered by the Supreme Court in
Crawford all contain, to varying degrees, a component of intent on behalf of the declarant,
with the possible exclusion of statements "made under circumstances which would lead an
objective witness reasonably to believe that the statement would be available for use at a
later trial"-and that exception suggests that the declarant must at least be on notice before
his statements can be deemed testimonial. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
238. See supra notes 107-08 and accompanying text.
239. See supra Part 1.B. 1-2.
240. See supra Part II.B.1-2.
241. See supra notes 64, 79 and accompanying text.
242. See supra Part II.B.2.
243. See supra Part II.B.1.
244. See supra notes 164-65 and accompanying text.
245. See supra notes 164-65 and accompanying text.
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determining the exact end point of an emergency might itself be a
troublesome task.246  But in such situations, the Supreme Court's
enthusiasm for the rule of forfeiture virtually invites the lower courts to
carve out exceptions to the confrontation right when the accused has in
some way procured the unavailability of the witnesses against him. 247
In addition to the policy benefits of the narrow approach, the Davis
opinion itself seems to implicitly, if not overtly, endorse it. The Court's
application of the ongoing emergency test to the facts of Davis and its
companion case provide ample indication of the Court's preference for a
narrow approach, as the opinion indicates that an emergency is deemed to
have ended at the time the danger to the declarant has passed, or perhaps
shortly thereafter. 248
The narrow approach should also be construed as a check against the
possibility of government-manufactured "emergencies." Since the Supreme
Court has identified the Confrontation Clause as a check against
prosecutorial abuse, 249 and since it has warned prosecutors and police
against manipulating their investigatory methods in order to circumvent the
clause,250 it would seem unlikely that the Court would allow the
introduction of testimonial statements against a defendant simply based on
an officer's assertion that an emergency was ongoing at the time of the
statements.251 Such "protection" against prosecutorial abuse would be no
protection at all, as it would reduce the Confrontation Clause to a readily
evaded formality. In such cases, the lower courts should demand some
form of objective evidence, above and beyond an officer's mere assertion
that an emergency existed, before determining the testimonial or
nontestimonial nature of statements against the accused made in such a
context.
C. The Need for a Two-Tiered Approach to
the Excited Utterance Exception
Davis presents an interesting quandary concerning excited utterances.
The opinion casts doubt on the viability of the excited utterance exception
in the confrontation context generally, while at the same time proposing a
constitutional test that is almost indistinguishable from the Supreme Court's
own description of the excited utterance test. 252 Because of this similarity,
there is some danger that these two separate doctrines could collapse into
one another,25 3 but such a result can and should be prevented by the
246. See Meier, supra note 123, at 26.
247. See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
248. See supra notes 79-86 and accompanying text.
249. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
250. See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
251. See supra notes 139-41 and accompanying text.
252. See supra note 210 and accompanying text.
253. See supra Part I.C. 1.
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implementation of a two-tiered approach to potentially testimonial
accusatorial statements admitted under the excited utterance exception. 254
By implementing a two-tiered test that determines, first, whether a
statement meets the excited utterance exception and, second, whether it is
barred by the Confrontation Clause, the courts will ensure the viability of
the Confrontation Clause as an independent constitutional guarantee,
preventing the evils that would arise by collapsing the two rules into one.255
Even if the same evidence, typically the circumstances surrounding the
making of the statement, is used to satisfy both rules, it is important to
perform both the hearsay analysis and the confrontation analysis
independently, as each rule is concerned with safeguarding a separate
principle: the hearsay rule assuring the reliability of out-of-court
statements, and the Confrontation Clause ensuring the right to cross-
examination.256
CONCLUSION
Davis attempts to improve upon Crawford by providing courts with
objective means for determining whether or not an out-of-court statement
triggers the Confrontation Clause. It does so by moving the lower courts'
inquiry away from the subjective mental state of the declarant and toward
an objective view of the circumstances in which the statement was made.
This approach will provide courts with something close to a bright-line rule,
which will tend to produce more consistent results across jurisdictions.
However, as Justice Thomas's dissent indicates, determining the primary
purpose of a police investigation may often prove a fool's errand. In such
cases, the lower courts should rightfully supplement their confrontation
review by focusing on the intent of the declarant at the time the statement
was made. Further, Davis's efforts to stabilize the confrontation doctrine
will succeed only insofar as the lower courts apply a narrow approach to the
"ongoing emergency" concept. Finally, to ensure the viability of the
Confrontation Clause as a separate doctrine, courts faced with admitting
excited utterances into evidence should not do so categorically. The
hearsay rule and the Confrontation Clause were designed to protect separate
values, and, although both doctrines require a similar factual analysis, each
rule must be considered individually in order to ensure both evidentiary
accuracy and constitutional protection against prosecutorial abuse.
254. See supra Part II.C.
255. See supra notes 211-19 and accompanying text.
256. See supra notes 29-31 and accompanying text.
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